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NOTES
Fair Trade-Economics and Constitutionality
One of the basic postulates of the democratic system of the United
States Government is that the governmental powers delegated by the people
should be separated to the greatest practicable extent. Since the founding
of this country great concentrations of governmental power have been
regarded with suspicion, and, for the most part, avoided by the division
of our government into administrative, legislative, and judicial branches.
This division has raised problems of an overlapping of functions. The ulti-
mate solution of these problems lies with the judiciaries of our state and
federal governments.' For this reason it is desirable that courts exercise
restraint in defining the area within which they can constitutionally act. If
such restraint is not exercised the concept of a separation of powers will
soon lose its significance. Recently some state courts have upset state legis-
lation permitting resale price maintenance by manufacturers. This result
has been reached by declaring their states' fair trade statutes unconstitu-
tional. It would seem that the courts which have taken this action have not
exercised the restraint prescribed by the doctrine of the separation of
powers.
During the 1930's fair trade laws were enacted by forty-five states.
These statutes, usually conforming to a general pattern,2 affect trade-mark
'U.S. CONST. art. III.
2 See 1 CALTMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MAmRKs 22.2, and model
smtutes in 5 CALLMAN 2250 (2d ed. 1950).
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or trade name goods which are in fair and open competition with goods
of the same class. By the enactment of the Miller-Tydings Amend-
ment to the Sherman Act, Congress permitted the states to legislate with
respect to trade-mark or trade name goods in interstate commerce.3 Prior
to this amendment the Supreme Court had held that minimum resale price
maintenance in interstate commerce violated the Sherman Act The pass-
age of Miller-Tydings, however, enabled -the states to enact legislation which
authorized fair trade contracts in both interstate and intrastate commerce.
By a fair trade contract the manufacturer establishes, as one of the condi-
tions of the sale of his product, a minimum price below which the con-
tracting wholesaler or retailer may not resell the trade-mark or trade name
product. The statutes also contain what has come to -be known as a "non-
signer" clause. By the terms of this clause a manufacturer, once having
established a minimum resale price schedule by means of one fair trade
contract, binds all retailers within the state and can enjoin even non-signers
from continuing sales at prices below those set by the fair trade contract.
In Old Dearborn Dtstributng Co. v. Seagram Dstillers Corp.,5 decided by
the Supreme Court in 1936, .the constitutionality of the state fair trade legis-
lation was upheld. In 1950, however, the Supreme Court ruled that since
non-signers were not mentioned in the Miller-Tydings Act, state fair trade
legislation could not affect non-signers engaged in interstate commerce.6
The McGuire Act, passed by Congress in 1952, made the state statutes
valid as to non-signers, even if they engaged in interstate commerce.7
Large-volume, low-cost distributors, since their profits are made by
underselling competition, are generally unwilling to sign fair trade con-
tracts. Many of these large-volume retailers, moreover, are not willing to
adhere -to the minimum price schedules established by the manufacturers.
On discovering that a retailer has been violating his price maintenance
schedule, the manufacturer usually requests by letter that the retailer dis-
continue the violation. If the practice continues the manufacturer may in-
stitute an action seeking injunctive relief and often damages. After the court
order has been obtained, if the retailer persists in his violations the manu-
facturer can institute civil or criminal contempt actions. Usually the re-
tailer's only defense is an attack on the constitutionality of the state fair
trade legislation.
Florida, in 1949, was the first state to declare its fair trade statute un-
'Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Act, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C.
S 1 (1952).
'Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
5299 U.S. 183 (1936).
' Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
166 STAT. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. 5 45 (1952).
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constitutional.8 Michigan followed in 1952. The ground for these de-
cisions was that fair trade statutes bore no substantial relation to public
morals, safety or general welfare. The Supreme Court of Georgia held
that the Georgia Fair Trade Act 0 violated the due process dause of the
state constitution,' in that the statute unreasonably deprived persons of the
valuable property right to contract' 2 The Supreme Court of Arkansas has
recently promulgated a similar decsion. 3 A lower court in Colorado has
ruled that a non-signer of a fair trade contract is unconstitutionally denied
his free use of property and freedom to dispose of his property as he
wishes. 4 The Supreme Court of Nebraska has held that fair trade legisla-
non violates the Nebraska constitution because it grants special privileges
and immunities to producers and wholesalers of trade-mark brands.' 6
The point which is most readily perceptible from these decisions is
that -they are not consistent. If a fundamental right is being invaded by
fair trade legislation there is certainly anything but a unanimity of opinion
as to just what that right is.' The lack of agreement on which fundamental
right is being unconstitutionally infringed is probably the most convincing
argument for the proposition (enunciated by the majority of the states'
decisions) ' 7 that no fundamental right is violated by fair trade legislation.' 8
It is interesting to note that in law review articles, most of the contemporary
writers ignore the constitutional questions involved in "fair trade" and
concern themselves mainly with a discussion of economic ramifications.19
'Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
'Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54
N.W.2d 268 (1952).
10GA. LAws Act 853, § 1-12 (1953).
1 1GA. CONST., Art. 1, § 1, par. 3.
"Cox v. General Electric Co., 211 Ga. 286, 85 SXB.2d 514 (1955).
"Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. White River Distributors, Inc., 224 Ark. 558,
275 S.W.2d 455 (1955)
"Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Francis, CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1955 Trade
Cas.) 5 67,984 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1955).
'"McGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 608
(1955).
" For a list of arguments advanced against the constitutionality of Fair Trade legisla-
non see: 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ! 3085 (1955).
"'For a summary of those states which have upheld the constitutionality of their Fair
Trade statutes see: 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 5 3085 (1955)
'Recently Ohio upheld the constitutionality of its Fair Trade statute in a common
pleas decision. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 130 N.E.2d
255 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1955).
"For recent discussions of the economic validity of the cases for and against Fair
Trade see: Adams, Fair Trade and the Art of Prestutigitatton, 65 YALE L. J. 196
(1955); Herman, A Note on Pair Trade, 65 YALE L. J. 23 (1955); Adams, Resale
Prsce Maintenance: Fact and Fancy, 64 YALE L. J. 967 (1955); Fulda, Resale Price
Mamntenance, 21 U. CHI. L REV. 175 (1954).
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The conclusion to be drawn from the apparent confusion as to why these
statutes are not constitutional is that the courts are making a decision based
on the economic wisdom of this legislation, but are then explaining their
decisions in what purport to be compelling constitutional arguments.
The work of the courts in protecting fundamental liberties has been, in
most instances, commendable. In the cases where fair trade statutes are
involved, however, it is highly questionable that a fundamental right is in
danger or that a real constitutional issue exists. Certainly the majority
view is that these laws are legitimate, constitutional exercises of the police
power of the state.2 0 Furthermore, many of the leading cases setting forth
the majority position hold that the question is strictly an economic one and
that the -legislature's findings in this area should not be disturbed by the
courts.21 As mentioned above, the inconsistency in the minority's opinions
lends support to the majority view. The fact that the question of the
wisdom of fair trade laws is largely an economic one, coupled with the
traditional view that economic questions are to be determined by the legis-
lature,22 leads to the conclusion that these minority courts have usurped the
function of their state legislatures.
There are cogent and valid reasons why courts should be more aware
of their power to legislate by declaring statutes unconstitutional and why
courts should use that power sparingly. First, the historical-political reasons
for court interference with the legislature are no longer present. The courts
no longer stand between the people and a Parliament controlled by a King. 3
Second, the legislature is a more efficient organ for the determination of
economic policy than the courts. A legislative committee is in a better
position to hear all sides of an economic debate than is a court which
suffers from the limitations of the adversary system.24 Third, the legislature
is more directly responsible and consequently responsive to the economic
'Max Factor v. Kunsman, 5 Cal.2d 446, 55 P.2d 177, aff'd, 299 U.S. 198 (1936);
Jos. Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 IIl. 559, 2 N.E.2d 929, affd, 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
' Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936);
Max Factor v. Kunsman, 5 Cal.2d 446, 55 P.2d 177 (1936); General Electric Co.
v. Masters, 307 N.Y. 229, 120 N.E.2d 802 (1954); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216
N.C. 163, 4 S.E.2d 528 (1939); Borden Co. v. Schreder, 182 Ore. 34, 185 P.2d 581
(1947); Sears v. Western Thrift Stores, Inc., 10 Wash.2d 372, 116 P.2d 756
(1941).
' Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934)
'Pound, Common Law and Legislaton, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908).
" "In many respects the legislative hearing provides a greater protection to the cs-
sential interests of society than does the trial. Self-limitation has made the judge a
referee. The legislator understands that he must bear full responsibility for his
decisions, and thus he is not content with evidence of interested parties. He must
search out every source which adds to the understanding and the determination of
the question before him." Horack, The Common Law of Legislaton, 23 IowA L
REV. 41, 52 (1937)
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needs and desires of the people.25 Fourth, it is important that courts be
more aware of their power to legislate in order that they may be better
able to follow the policy of the legislature and to resist the temptation to
enact by decision their own preconceptions and notions of wise policy. 8
Finally, it is vital -that courts heed the proscriptions of the state and federal
constitutions and the traditional American ideas with respect to the separa-
tion of powers. This constitutional approach is advocated by two eminent
jurists, Holmes,2 7 and Frankfurter. In the words of Mr. Justice Frank-
farter:
In a democracy the legislative impulse and its expression should come
from those popularly chosen to legislate and equipped to devise policy, as
the courts are nore
The application of this approach by the courts seems necessary if we are to
continue under present theories of constitutional government.
It may well be, as suggested by one courts2 that the question of the
wisdom of fair trade legislation needs reopening and reinvestigation. Cer-
tainly, the great amount of judicial activity in this area suggests that there is
considerable opposition to such laws. For the courts to undertake the
task, though, would be extremely unwise because of the reasons outlined
above. Admittedly, it is difficult for the courts to draw a line beyond
which they will not interfere with legislative activity. The Supreme Court
of Delaware has rendered a decision which reaffirms .the rule laid down by
the United States Supreme Court in the Old Dearborn case.30 In what
might be a serviceable test for the determination of whether a question is
economic in nature and consequently a legislative problem, the Delaware
court has said -that it will not upset legislation whose economic soundness
is "fairly debatable." In the words of the court:
Not only are these questions "fairly debatable"; they have been warmly
debated for years, and the debate, we gather, is still going on. The legis-
lative judgment must therefore prevail'
It is submitted, with respect to any test the courts might apply, that the de-
Ir- Iid.
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Nicholls v. Lynn, 297 Mass. 65, 7
N.E.2d 577 (1937); Campbell v. New York, 244 N.Y. 317, 155 N.E. 628 (1927);
14 AM. JuR., Courts § 203 (1938).
See Holmes' decision in Tyson v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1926).
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
528, 545 (1947).
'Eli Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros., 109 F. Supp. 269, 271 (E.D. La. 1953),
aft'd, 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 856 (1954).
'SOld Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
'General Electric Co. v. Klein, 106 A.2d 206, 211 (Del. 1954)
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